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Institutional Arrangements and the Law of the Sea
BERNARD H. OxMAN*
Many international institutions are concerned exclusively or
primarily with the oceans. Most cannot avoid some connection. Much
of this concern is a direct response to the increasing tempo, impor-
tance, and diversity of man's activities at sea. Current efforts to estab-
lish a universal charter for the oceans are another such response.
What is the relationship between these responses? Surely they
are (or ought to be) complementary. The question is whether the
relationship is more profound: whether the substance of the law of
the sea and the nature of international institutions for the oceans are
mutually dependent. One aspect of this question relates to the func-
tions performed by international institutions within the overall struc-
ture of the law of the sea. A relevant inquiry then is whether, how,
and to what extent the operation of the law depends upon such in-
stitutions. The author proposes to examine that question in connec-
tion with a basic legal problem, namely the allocation of jurisdiction
at sea in a manner that best protects the interests affected.
There are two basic types of jurisdiction over activities at sea.
One is jurisdiction based on nationality, more frequently the national-
ity of a ship, aircraft, or other vehicle or structure than the nationality
of an individual or company. 1 Another is jurisdiction based on adja-
cancy (or proximity) to land territory, such as jurisdiction over the ter-
ritorial sea, contiguous zone, continental shelf, and more recently
fisheries (or economic) zones.
2
* Columbia University, A.B. 1962, J.D. 1965. Associate Professor, University of
Miami School of Law. United States Representative and Vice-Chairman of the U.S.
Delegation, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views
of the Department of State of the U.S. Government.
1. The universal jurisdiction of a State over individuals and companies of its
nationality of course obtains at sea as well as on land. However, it generally plays no
special role in the organization of activities at sea, yielding as frequently to flag State
jurisdiction at sea as it does to territorial jurisdiction on land.
2. While the rule of discovery and effective occupation has been the major basis
for establishing territorial jurisdiction on land, it has had no significant role in the
international law of the sea for centuries. The acquisition of prescriptive rights over
so-called "historic bays," and isolated assertions of preemptive fishing rights prior to
the advent of modern continental shelf and fisheries jurisdiction concepts, are easily
distinguished as variants or precursors of the adjacency (proximity) basis of jurisdic-
tion, and in any event are too narrow to support the existence of a generalized rule of
discovery and occupation at sea. The existence of such a generalized rule of discovery
and occupation at sea. The existence of such a generalized rule is contradicted by
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Jurisdiction based on nationality is universal: the flag State re-
tains jurisdiction over its ships wherever they may be. Jurisdiction
based on adjacency (or proximity) is limited both as to area and gen-
erally as to subject matter. To determine whether a ship is subject to
the concurrent jurisdiction of a coastal State, one must determine
whether the ship is both in an area and conducting an activity subject
to the jurisdiction of that coastal State. A ship may be in an area
subject to coastal State jurisdiction (e.g., fisheries jurisdiction) but
conducting an activity that is not subject to coastal State jurisdiction
in that area (e.g., navigation); or, a ship may be conducting an activity
subject to coastal State jurisdiction, in which case it is subject to the
concurrent jurisdiction of the flag State and the coastal State.
These jurisdictional approaches significantly affect the need and
potential for international cooperation. States usually will be least en-
thusiastic about international cooperation when the object is to limit
their discretion with respect to activities subject to their jurisdiction;
States usually will be most enthusiastic about international coopera-
tion when the object is to limit activities that are not subject to their
jurisdiction, particularly if they seek to prevent possible harm from
such activities or, more recently, to participate in the benefits of such
activities. 3 Geographic and functional limitations on the jurisdiction
of any given State to specific areas, specific activities, and specific
ships tend to produce schizophrenic attitudes towards international
cooperation in many, if not most, governments. While the problem of
balancing costs and benefits exists with respect to all international
cooperative arrangements, the more complex jurisdictional situation
at sea complicates the problem, as Ambassador Richardson's discus-
sion in this issue makes clear.
There is a tendency to associate cooperation with joint action.
This is not necessarily the case. One function of establishing clear
jurisdictional divisions is to permit a basic kind of cooperation-respect
for the independence of others and noninterference in matters essen-
Article 2 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, 499
U.N.T.S. 311, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, which provides that the rights of
the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, and by
Articles 2 and 6 of the Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, 450
U.N.T.S. 82, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, which prohibit sovereignty claims,
confirm that the freedoms of the high seas are exercised by all States, and provide for
the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State over its ships.
3. Participation can include direct protection from competition for activities of
nations of the States concerned, transfer of technology, or the imposition and sharing
of economic rent.,
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tially of concern to them. The United Nations Charter protects the
"political independence" of States from the threat or use of force, and
does not authorize the United Nations "to intervene in matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State." 4 The
restraint of an affected State in acquiescing in the acts or omissions of
another may represent the highest degree of cooperation.
Seen in this light, the allocation of jurisdiction at sea should in
theory promote a situation in which each State, to the maximum pos-
sible degree, is able to accept the decisions of other States on matters
subject to their jurisdiction. The allocation therefore should be
roughly proportionate to the distribution of interests.
While economists, environmentalists, political scientists, and
others would probably agree that few if any significant acts of a State
have purely "domestic" consequences, there is a substantial sphere of
discretionary action in which foreign States are prepared to tolerate
some adverse effects. Four of the factors that influence the size of the
sphere of tolerable discretionary action are: (1) the sensitivity and
magnitude of foreign interests affected; (2) the extent to which af-
fected foreign States are prepared to rely on the informal political
process, rather than legal or institutional limitations, to encourage a
reasonable degree of restraint in the State or States with jurisdiction;
(3) the ability of foreign States to induce the State or States with
jurisdiction to accept legal or institutional limitations; and (4) the ex-
tent to which affected foreign States desire to preserve their own dis-
cretion to act in the same, related or analogous fields free from legal
or institutional limitations.
There is no way to allocate jurisdiction at sea that would not
subject significant interests of one State to the exercise of jurisdiction
by another. Allocation of jurisdiction on the basis of nationality
primarily reflects an economic or other interest (of the flag State or
any other State being served) in conducting an activity free of foreign
control. Allocation of jurisdiction on the basis of adjacency (or proxim-
ity) primarily reflects an economic or other interest of the coastal
State in limiting the conduct of an activity close to its coast in order
to reserve it to itself, extract economic rent, or minimize adverse
effects. Accordingly, the source of pressures for legal or institutional
limitations on the sphere of discretionary action of the State to which
jurisdiction is allocated may be one or more of the following:
4. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 4, 7.
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(1) Neither the nationality nor the adjacency (or proximity)
basis for allocating jurisdiction reflects the interests of a State in
limiting foreign discretion to conduct an activity in areas that are
far from its coast or areas that are close to its coast but subject to
the geographic jurisdiction of its neighbors.
(2) Allocation of jurisdiction on the basis of nationality does
not reflect the interest of a State in limiting foreign discretion to
conduct an activity in areas close to its coast.
(3) Allocation of jurisdiction on the basis of geographic proxim-
ity does not reflect the interest of a State in conducting activities in
areas that are closer to the coast of one or more other States or in
securing the maximum possibilities for procuring the conduct of an
activity or a resultant service or product.
The interests of a State in navigation and communication extend
far beyond any areas in which it could hope to exercise jurisdiction on
a geographic basis. The interests of a State in protecting its coastal
regions from pollution similarly extend to activities in areas far
beyond those in which it could hope to exercise jurisdiction on a
geographic basis. At the same time, its concern about pollution from
foreign ships close to its coast may qualify its global interest in pro-
tecting navigation from coastal State interference. Allocation of juris-
diction on a geographic basis is certain to result in jurisdictional lines
that divide common resource pools: fish stocks that should be con-
served and managed as a whole; fluid nonliving resources that should
be the subject of some understandings if unnecessary inefficiencies
are to be avoided in a race to extract them; or entire seas or oceans
that should be the object of coordinated environmental restraints im-
posed by many States on many activities, including activities on land.
Allocation of jurisdiction on a basis of nationality is certain to result in
competing demands to use the same area or resource, posing similar
problems of conservation, avoidance of inefficiency, and environmen-
tal protection.
Customary international law is the classic instrument for allocat-
ing jurisdiction and establishing legal limitations on that jurisdiction.
It is a blunt instrument. Acquiescence in a fairly broad sphere of
discretion would normally be implicit in acquiescence in a system of
allocation of jurisdiction. Separation of legislative and enforcement
jurisdiction is not common. "Jurisdiction" follows upon, and in turn
implies, the power to exercise direct physical control free of foreign
interference. Accordingly, discomfort with the sphere of discretion of
the State with jurisdiction need not manifest itself only in attempts to
impose legal or institutional restraints on the exercise of jurisdiction.
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It may manifest itself in opposition to the allocation of jurisdiction
itself. That opposition may not be exclusively substantive: there may
be attempts to impose legal and institutional restraints on the means
by which an allocation is established. The Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea may be viewed as such an institutional
restraint.
Were a new island formed in the Pacific many hundreds of miles
from the territory of any State, it would be terra nullius. Nationals of
all States could visit and use the island. Sooner or later, a State might
desire to limit foreign action on the island. It has three options, al-
though many variants are possible:
(1) It could claim geographic jurisdiction over all or part of the
island for some or all purposes, and seek to induce acquiescence in
that claim through a combination of power. and reassurances re-
garding foreign interests. (An attempt to control foreigners directly
is generally a variant of this option.)
(2) It could seek an agreement with foreign States whose na-
tionals are active on the island under which they will limit the
actions of their nationals.
(3) It could seek an agreement with all States under which
they will limit the actions of their nationals.
The fundamental difference between the regime of the land and
the regime of freedom of the high seas is that the first option is gen-
erally precluded by the latter regime. Thus the Convention on the
High Seas not only prohibits claims of sovereignty over the high seas,
but confirms the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State over its ships
on the high seas save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in
the Convention or some other treaty.
5
The practical situation at sea historically supported the allocation
of jurisdiction on the basis of nationality, emphasizing interests in
conducting activities (or ensuring that they are conducted) rather than
in limiting discretion to conduct activities. Navigation and communi-
cation interests of States were far flung and frequently global. Politi-
cal and military alliances and interests were also far flung and fre-
5. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 2, art. 6; accord, Informal Compo-
site Negotiating Text, arts. 89, 92, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ICNT].
The question of whether this rule of high seas law is a matter of allocation or
limitation, while an interesting historical, philosophical, and semantic inquiry, need
not detain us here. It has already been noted that allocation of jurisdiction is a means
of dealing with the problem of the sphere of discretion of a foreign State. The regime
of freedom of the high seas reduces to zero the sphere of discretion of a State that
might claim to exercise geographic jurisdiction.
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quently global. Neighbors were not infrequently the perceived secu-
rity threat, and a distant maritime power the protective or stabilizing
force against both the neighbors and other maritime powers. Fish
stocks were generally ample to support fishing efforts, which were
primarily local. Environmental problems either did not exist or were
largely ignored.
Even in such a situation, allocation of jurisdiction on the basis of
nationality was not alone adequate to resolve certain problems. In
particular, two problems required limitations on the sphere of exclu-
sive discretion of the State of nationality: piracy and physical accom-
modation of uses.
Concepts of State responsibility were not an adequate response
to the problem of piracy. Many pirate ships did not have the national-
ity of a State (at least a recognized State prepared to cooperate in the
suppression of piracy). Moreover, the flag State could not effectively
police all the ships of its nationality throughout the world, particularly
those seized by pirates.
Major trading States were of course under constant pressure to
suppress piracy, and had no interest in protecting pirates or pirate
ships. The legal argument that the pirate is outside the protections of
the international system of allocation of jurisdiction therefore accords
with reality, but only if the individual really is a pirate. The problem
lay in allocation of jurisdiction to make the determination: to board,
inspect, arrest, and try those in control of any ship on the high seas,
on suspicion of piracy.
Since the law of piracy developed from custom and practice, it
can be argued that universal jurisdiction should be added as a "fourth
option" with respect to the control of foreign activities on the new
Pacific island, particularly since the law of piracy itself applies not
only on the high seas but in any other "place outside the jurisdiction
of any State." As a practical matter, this approach can be regarded as
a variant of one of the two agreement options.
6
In sum, a solution to the piracy problem was found in universal allo-
cation of jurisdiction. It rested upon a pooling of national capabilities,
6. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 2, arts. 15, 19; accord, ICNT, supra
note 5, arts. 101, 105. Although an emergency detention of a foreign national might
prove necessary, and presumably might be justified after the fact on some universal
protective (humanitarian) theory, a lawyer concerned with maintaining the principle
of exclusive jurisdiction of the state of nationality could provide for the practical prob-
lem by arguing implied consent. Despite contemporary impatience with using legal
fictions to adapt strict law categories to exceptional situations, one can see a certain
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doubtlessly with informal international cooperation, 7 but without any
formal international institutions to further that cooperation or to con-
trol abuse. 8
The problem of physical accommodation of uses is classically ad-
dressed by limiting the sphere of discretion of the user (and hence
the State of nationality). Each State is bound to exercise the freedoms
of the high seas "with reasonable regard to the interests of other
States in their exercise of the freedoms of the high seas." 9  It is
important to bear in mind that the allocation of exclusive jurisdiction
to the flag State is not altered by the imposition of this legal duty on
the flag State. Putting aside actions to deal with imminent danger,
enforcement at sea of the duty to exercise "reasonable regard" is the
exclusive responsibility of the flag State. 10
Avoidance of collisions and accidents-the classic maritime ac-
commodation of use problem-is in the interests of all concerned.
While some differences might emerge on questions of priority of
uses, most of them would normally be resolved in favor of the less
mobile user outside confined spaces (e.g., the fishing boat with its
nets out). The basic interest is in having the rules; as long as they
make technical sense, there is no overriding interest in their sub-
stance.
There is however a considerable interest in universal respect for
the rules. Since virtually all of the rules can be regarded as precise
applications of the "reasonable regard" obligation, there is no diffi-
culty in principle in relying upon the commonly accepted practices of
merit in avoiding the creation of an exception in principle to a system of jurisdictional
allocation under customary law, particularly where an implication of consent by the
State of nationality in fact comports with the likely position of that State.
7. Such cooperation is required. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 2,
art. 15; accord, ICNT, supra note 5, art. 100.
8. There is liability to the flag State for seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion
of piracy "without adequate grounds" and provision for compensating a ship that
suffers loss or damage as a result of a boarding and search based on unfounded suspi-
cions and not justified by action of the ship. Convention on the High Seas, supra
note 2, arts. 20, 22; accord, ICNT, supra note 5, arts. 106, 110. However, no special
institutions are created to implement this liability, at least pending adoption of a new
Law of the Sea Convention containing a general system for third-party settlement of
disputes. More widespread ratification of the 1958 Optional Protocol on Settlement of
Disputes is unlikely.
9. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 2, art. 2; accord, ICNT, supra note
5, art. 87 (substituting "due consideration" for "reasonable regard").
10. Should the ship subsequently enter port or otherwise come within the juris-
diction of a foreign State, a question of civil liability and, in rare instances, criminal
responsibility might be raised in the courts of that State.
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mariners as the source of the international law obligation, binding on
all States. The mariners are not making international law; rather,
their customs are the reference point for determining the precise ap-
plication of the "reasonable regard" rule.
Among the problems with relying on custom is that this presents
difficulties with respect to change, adaptation to new technology, and
communication of increasingly complex requirements. The rules of
the road eventually must be written. Those written rules must be
universally binding. A universal conference called to prepare a uni-
versally accepted treaty is the obvious conclusion. Since the subject
matter is highly technical, a smaller body of maritime experts is
likely to prepare texts for the conference. Since periodic revision
may be necessary, provision may be made for periodic review and
consultation. One may call this a system entailing a diplomatic con-
ference, a treaty, and an amendment or revision procedure. Or one
may call this an international regulatory organization. In practice, the
work of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO) entails both aspects." What is clear is that an international
legislative drafting institution has evolved to meet the need for uni-
form technical limitations.12
There are now over one hundred-fifty independent States in the
world. Each has the right to sail ships under its flag. It is probably impos-
sible to get every State to ratify every technical treaty and amend-
ment needed to achieve uniformity within any reasonable period of
time, if at all. It is also difficult to get every State to ratify a treaty
under which States parties are automatically bound by subsequent
regulations adopted through some organization or procedure with less
than unanimous affirmative consent. Recalling that the nature of the
problem is to determine the precise application of the "reasonable
regard" obligation of all States, another solution combines traditional
reliance on maritime custom with highly advanced views regarding
11. See Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organiza-
tion, signed March 6, 1948, 289 U.N.T.S. 48, 9 U.S.T. 621, T.I.A.S. No. 444 [here-
inafter cited as IMCO Convention].
12. It is interesting to note that these legislative functions are associated with the
work of an international organization whose very title includes the word "consulta-
tive." In dealing with similar problems, the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation is
much more direct. It establishes a procedure for "rules and recommended practices"
and requires adherence to the rules of the International Civil Aviation Organization
for civil aviation over the high seas. Convention on International Civil Aviation,
opened for signature December 7, 1944, art. 12, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 61 Stat. 1180,
T.I.A.S. No 1591, 3 Bevans 944.
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the legislative (not merely drafting) functions of international organi-
zations. Article 10 of the Convention on the High Seas provides:
1. Every State shall take such measures for ships under its
flag as are necessary to ensure safety at sea with regard inter alia
to:
(a) The use of signals, the maintenance of communications
and the prevention of collisions;
(b) The manning of ships and labour conditions for crews
taking into account the applicable international labour
instruments;
(c) The construction, equipment and seaworthiness of
ships.
2. In taking such measures each State is required to conform
to generally accepted international standards and to take any steps
which may be necessary to ensure their observance.
If the "international standard" is "generally accepted," it is bind-
ing on all whether or not the instrument elaborating the standard has
been ratified. 13  The question of what constitutes "'general accep-
tance" is of course a substantial one. The functional purposes of the
requirement would suggest that the standard is both quantitative and
qualitative; that is, acceptance should be widespread among States
with substantial interests at stake. If there is a division of opinion as
to whether a stricter standard has replaced an earlier standard, that
would not alter the duty to respect the earlier, less stringent standard
pending emergence of "general acceptance" of the stricter standard.
In principle the solution to the problem of physical accommodation
of uses under the regime of the high seas therefore is to place agreed
limitations on the sphere of discretion of the State of nationality. If at
least the safety limitations are "generally accepted," then the sphere
of discretion of the State of nationality is accordingly limited whether
or not that State has expressly agreed to be bound by the limitations
in question. Enforcement of the limitations generally remains the re-
sponsibility of the State of nationality.
13. The express reference to international labor instruments has the effect of an
exclusion. It is apparent that certain international labor instruments were regarded as
inapplicable or, even if applicable, not generally accepted as they need only be taken
into account. Article 94 of the ICNT, supra note 5, further elaborates the duties of
the flag State and, lest there be any doubt that the reference to "international stan-
dards" was intended to include the work product of international institutions, substi-
tutes for "generally accepted international standards" the term "generally accepted
international regulations, procedures and practices" in specifying the duty of all
States to comply.
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The establishment of traffic separation schemes presents an in-
teresting illustration of this process. "The objective of traffic separa-
tion schemes is to reduce the risk of collision in converging areas.
dense traffic areas, or where restricted sea room limits freedom of
movement by shipping." 14 Under a traffic separation scheme, there
is normally a traffic separation line or separation zone that divides
traffic moving in opposite directions, much like the center island on a
highway. Since IMCO was granted no binding legislative power in
the field by its charter, 15 and since it did not submit traffic separation
schemes "adopted" by it to governments for ratification in treaty
form, these schemes were generally regarded as recommendatory in
character.
While a respectable argument could certainly be made that
"generally accepted" traffic separation schemes are legally binding
under the rule stated in Article 10 of the Convention of the High
Seas, the desire to ensure that traffic separation rules are binding
finally manifested itself in new provisions in the 1972 revisions to the
International Regulations For Preventing Collisions at Sea (1972 COL-
REGS). 16 Rule 1(d) permits IMCO to adopt traffic separation
schemes "for the purpose of these Rules." "New Rule 10 makes pre-
viously recommended procedures respecting traffic separation
schemes compulsory for vessels if in or near schemes adopted by
IMCO." 17 Thus parties to the 1972 COLREGS are automatically
bound by traffic separation schemes adopted by IMCO. In addition,
the inclusion of these provisions in the new international regulations
adds further credence to the argument that generally accepted traffic
separation schemes are binding on all States pursuant to the rule
stated in Article 10 of the Convention of the High Seas.
Thus one has reached, or virtually reached, a situation in which a
State is legally bound to respect a rule adopted by an international
organization despite the fact that the State is not a member of the
organization and has not approved the rule. Such a result is not, and
should not be regarded as, the norm with respect to the legal effect
of institutional arrangements regarding the oceans; rather, it is a re-
sponse to the uncontested need for universally respected limitations
in this field, and a reflection of the confidence of those affected in the
14. U.S. Coast Guard, Navigation Rules, CG-169 (1977) Comments to Rule 10,
Convention on Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, T.I.A.S. No. 8587
[hereinafter cited as 72 COLREGS].
15. IMCO Convention, supra note 11, arts. 2-4. See ICNT, supra note 5, art. 22.
16. 72 COLREGS, supra note 14, Rules I (d) & 10.
17. Id. Comments to Rule 10.
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competence, responsiveness, and fairness of the institution to which
virtual legislative power is delegated. In this regard, it should be
noted that of the eighteen (formerly sixteen) members of IMCO's
Council, six must be governments of States with "the largest interest
in providing international shipping services" and six others must be
governments of States with "the largest interest in international sea-
borne trade." 1" Eight of the sixteen (formerly fourteen) members of
IMCO's Maritime Safety Committee must be "elected from among
the ten largest ship-owning States." 19
In sum, the accommodation of use problem posed by the alloca-
tion of jurisdiction on the basis of nationality is resolved by the im-
position of legal limitations on the prescriptive discretion of the State
of nationality coupled with an increasing role for international institu-
tional limitations on the sphere of prescriptive discretion, with few
limitations on exclusive enforcement discretion.
Allocation of jurisdiction on a geographic basis did not develop as
the solution to the problem of accommodation of uses. 20  Thus it is
interesting to note that although the classic international law of the
sea does allocate some jurisdiction -indeed sovereignty-on a geo-
graphic basis in the form of internal waters and the traditional ter-
ritorial sea, that jurisdiction is qualified by the establishment of a right
of innocent passage for ships of all States in the territorial sea and certain
internal waters. Thus a question of allocation of jurisdiction is posed
once again. On the one hand, a right of innocent passage for the flag
State would imply a measure of jurisdiction regarding the exercise of
that right. At the same time, the sovereignty of the coastal State,
particularly the rule that "passage is innocent so long as it is not
18. IMCO Convention, arts. 17 & 18, as amended, resolution of Sept. 15, 1964,
607 U.N.T.S. 276, 18 U.S.T. 1299, T.I.A.S. No. 6285.
19. Id. art. 28, as amended, resolution of Sept. 28, 1965. 629 U.N.T.S. 334, 19
U.S.T. 4855, T.I.A.S. No. 6490.
20. Geographic jurisdiction would have been contrary to the underlying assump-
tion of the regime of the high seas, namely that the jurisdiction of the flag State is
exclusive. Nevertheless, the principle could have been maintained through the de-
vice of agreement of flag States to qualify their exclusive jurisdiction by allowing
some sharing of competence. Generally, this did not occur. The reasons probably
relate primarily to the fact that the uses involved are transitory: the imposition of
differing rules in different places might at best lead to confusion and a higher chance
of accident and at worst to conflicting requirements with respect to matters that
involve more than the behavior of a ship or aircraft while it is in a particular area,
such as requirements with respect to construction, equipment, manning or design.
Thus it might well be concluded that a sharing of jurisdiction with respect to such
matters not only presented theoretical problems with respect to the exclusive juris-
diction of the State of nationality on the high seas, but very real problems of subor-
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prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal
State," 2 1 would imply a measure of jurisdiction of the coastal State,
particularly on matters other than innocent passage or affected by
passage.
Under Rule 1 of the 1972 COLREGS, in general the solution is
to apply the international regulations in the high seas and the territo-
rial sea, while allowing special rules to be made by the coastal State
in classic internal waters which "shall conform as closely as possible
to" the international rules. 22  Thus jurisdiction based on nationality
and jurisdiction based on geographic proximity are both limited by
the same rules in response to the need for functional uniformity. 23
One of the interesting aspects of the Informal Composite
Negotiating Text (ICNT) before the Third U.N. Conference on the
Law of the Sea relates to the attempt to clarify and modernize the
rules regarding innocent passage in the territorial sea. 24  It deals in
greater detail with the problem of allocation of jurisdiction between
the coastal State and the flag State with respect to ships exercising
the right of innocent passage. Article 21 of that text establishes the
right of the coastal State to make laws and regulations relating to
innocent passage through the territorial sea on specified matters, in-
cluding the safety of navigation and the regulation of marine traffic.
At the same time it requires foreign ships exercising the right of in-
nocent passage to comply not only with the laws and regulations of
the coastal State, but with all generally accepted international regula-
tions relating to the prevention of collisions at sea. This would seem
to require that at the least the coastal State regulations not be incon-
dinating the interest in use-in this case navigation and communication-to the dis-
cretionary jurisdiction of a foreign State.
21. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done April 29,
1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, art. 14(4) [hereinafter
cited as Territorial Sea Convention] ICNT, supra note 5, art. 19(1).
22. 72 COLREGS, supra note 14. Paragraphs (a) & (b) of Rule 1 provide:
(a) These Rules shall apply to all vessels upon the high seas and in all
waters connected therewith navigable by seagoing vessels.
(b) Nothing in these Rules shall interfere with the operation of special
rules made by an appropriate authority for roadsteads, harbors, rivers,
lakes or inland waterways connected with the high seas and navigable by
seagoing vessels. Such special rules shall conform as closely as possible to
these Rules.
23. In this connection, it is interesting to note that the right of innocent passage
does not apply to overflight, and that accordingly the question of allocation of juris-
diction does not arise in the same way. Thus, tinder the Convention on International
Civil Aviation, supra note 12, the coastal State is permitted to take exception to the
international rules with respect to its territorial sea as well as its internal waters.
24. ICNT, supra note 5, pt. II, Sec. 3.
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sistent with the international regulations relating to the prevention of
collisions at sea. The article, in perhaps its most controversial clause,
goes on to provide that the coastal State laws and regulations "shall
not apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment of
foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally accepted rules
or standards." 25
The combined effect of the ICNT provisions on innocent passage
is to apply a rule to both the coastal State and the flag State analog-
ous to the rule of Article 10 of the High Seas Convention. In effect,
the legal and institutional limitations on the sphere of discretion of
the State with jurisdiction not only become a solution to a problem
posed by the allocation of jurisdiction, but in some cases become
a means for resolving differences of opinion as to the appropriate allo-
cation of jurisdiction, in this case between the coastal State and the
flag State with respect to innocent passage. Thus, to the extent that
international legal or institutional restraints significantly reduce the
sphere of discretion of the State with jurisdiction, there should be
less practical difficulty in reaching agreement on the allocation of such
jurisdiction.
While institutional arrangements for physical accommodation of
navigation and communications uses have been global in character,
institutional arrangements with respect to fisheries have typically
been regional. In this respect, it is important to note that the use of
the term "regional" in this context generally refers to the area in
which fishing is a subject of regulation, rather than to the geographic
location of the States that will be engaged by the international institu-
tional effort. A classic example of a traditional regional fisheries ar-
rangement is the International Convention for Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries, pursuant to which only a small minority of the States par-
ties bordered the area in which fisheries were regulated. 26 In some
cases the migratory characteristics of the particular stocks of interest
necessitate the application of fisheries arrangements to a very broad
geographic area, as for example under the Atlantic Tuna Conven-
tion 27 and the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Convention,2 8 or indeed
25. Id. art. 21(2).
26. International Convention for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, done Feb. 8,
1949, 157 U.N.T.S. 157, 1 U.S.T. 477, T.I.A.S. No. 2089. For a discussion of
fisheries management, see Clingan, The Changing Global Pattern of Fisheries Man-
agement, 10 LAw. AM. 658 (1978).
27. International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna, done May 14,
1966, 673 U.N.T.S. 63, 20 U.S.T. 2887, T.I.A.S. No. 6767.
28. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Convention, signed May 31, 1949, 80 U.N.T.S.
3, 1 U.S.T. 230, T.I.A.S. No. 2044.
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to the oceans as a whole, as for example under the International
Whaling Convention.
29
The allocation of jurisdiction over fishing to the coastal State
within the territorial sea and to the flag State beyond the territorial
sea (or a relatively narrow fishing zone) determined the composition
of the regional fisheries organizations prior to the widespread adop-
tion of 200-mile fishing zones. In theory the composition of a regional
fisheries organization could be universal. In fact, those organizations
typically included the coastal States bordering the area in question
and States whose nationals were engaged in fishing in the area. These
institutional arrangements were necessary because it was normally not
possible for any one State to impose and enforce conservation reg-
ulations on foreigners fishing for a particular stock. A procedure was
needed under which all those fishing for a stock would be bound to
respect the conservation and management limitations established by
(or with the consent of) all the flag States concerned.
Since the necessity for conservation limitations generally arises
because a stock would be overfished by those currently engaged in
the fishery in the absence of imposed limitations, interesting ques-
tions arise with respect to the legal rights and duties of a potential
new entrant in the crowded fishery. One approach to the problem is of
course to be willing to admit potential new entrants into the fisheries
organization. Similarly, the new entrant, in order to implement its
duty to cooperate with other States to conserve the fish stocks, 30
should be willing to enter the organization. The practical problem is
one of allocation of quotas. If all existing members are already re-
straining excess capacity, they could hardly be expected to welcome a
situation in which they would have to share future allocations with a
new member. Even as the notion of a harvesting capacity "prefer-
ence" for coastal State fishermen developed, the coastal State was
wary of permitting the establishment of any new "traditional" in-
terests, if not rights. 3 1 The 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conser-
29. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, signed Dec. 2, 1946,
161 U.N.T.S. 72, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849.
30. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, done April 29, 1958, 559 U.N.T.S. 285, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, arts.
1, 4; ICNT, supra note 5, art. 63.
31. It is interesting to note in this connection that throughout the life of the
International Commission for North Pacific Fisheries-comprised of Canada, Japan,
and the United States-no new members were admitted and there were no new
entrants into the salmon fishery regulated by that commission, despite the fact that
that period witnessed an immense increase in and diversification of global fisheries
effort. See also Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1974]
I.C.J. 3.
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vation of the Living Resources of the High Seas32 attempts to deal
with the strictly legal problem of the new entrant by obliging the new
entrant to apply the existing measures, "which shall not be dis-
criminatory in form or in fact," to its own nationals, and which sub-
jects the new entrant to compulsory third-party dispute settlement
procedures in the event it does not apply those measures.
33
There is no indication that the legal problem of new entrants was
responsible to any significant degree for the eventual decision of a
large majority of coastal States to seek a major alteration in the alloca-
tion of jurisdiction with respect to fisheries. It would seem rather that
one of the major causes of the vast extension of coastal State fisheries
jurisdiction can be found in the fact that the allocation of jurisdiction
on the basis of nationality necessarily required the consent of a poten-
tially large number of flag States to any limiting agreements, and that
a juridical requirement for such consent-or any likely voting arrange-
ment within an organization-tended to reflect the emphasis on utiliza-
tion rather than limitation that is a general characteristic of allocation
of jurisdiction on the basis of nationality. Whatever the reasons, the
flag States were unwilling or unable to place limitations on the sphere
of their discretion to fish that were extensive enough to satisfy the
interests and rising expectations of the coastal States. Indeed it can
be questioned whether anything short of a fundamental change in
jursidictional allocation could have satisified the rising demands for
national control of extractive industries in many countries of the
world, particularly developing countries and other countries that are
exporters of raw materials.
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was
called to review the regimes of the law of the sea in a comprehensive
manner. As might be expected, any such review would elicit objec-
tions from some quarters regarding any allocation of jurisdiction,
since, as we have seen, no allocation can in and of itself deal
adequately with the protection of interests other than those of the
State to which jurisdiction is allocated. Needless to say, attempts to
moderate divergences arising from opposing viewpoints on questions
of allocation of jurisdiction would inevitably concentrate on the possi-
bility of imposing legal or institutional limitations on the State to
which jurisdiction is allocated. This process affected allocations of
jurisdiction with respect to both area and subject matter.
32. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, supra note 30.
33. Id. arts. 5, 9.
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
With respect to area, the ICNT would establish a twelve nautical
mile maximum limit for the breadth of the territorial sea. 3 4  The
greater detail of this text over the Territorial Sea Convention with
respect to the rules of innocent passage 35 is probably to some degree
due to the fact that the twelve-mile territorial sea would embrace a
substantially larger area than the traditional thr~e-mile limit. More
importantly, this geographic allocation of jurisdiction drew attention
to the problem of limitations on such jurisdiction in straits. States
sought clearer protection for the jurisdiction of the flag State with
respect to shipping in straits than would be afforded by the rules of
innocent passage. In addition, the expansion of the territorial sea
brought into focus the question of communications activities, such as
overflight of straits, that are not within the scope of innocent pas-
sage. 36
Thus, the allocation of jurisdiction to the flag State with respect
to transit of straits is broader and subject to fewer ambiguities and
exceptions than it is in the territorial sea generally.37 This attempt to
balance the expansion of the territorial sea with new provisions to
protect the interests of the flag State in turn required new provisions
to ensure that the allocation of jurisdiction to the flag State in straits
is subject to limitations designed to accommodate the interests of
States bordering straits, particularly those regarding safety and en-
vironmental protection. Therefore, the ICNT elaborates in consider-
able detail obligations of the flag State with respect to the exercise of
the right of transit passage of straits designed to protect and accom-
modate the relevant interests of States bordering straits. These obli-
gations include a duty to respect international environmental and
safety measures in general and, in particular, to respect traffic separa-
tion and related measures drawn up by the strait States and adopted
by the competent international organization.3 8 This marks still
another step in the use of the principle of Article 10 of the Conven-
tion on the High Seas.
The provisions of the ICNT with respect to the 200-mile
economic zone reflect the major effort of the Third United Nations
Conference 'on the Law of the Sea with respect to reallocation of
jurisdiction at sea. The effect of the concept of the economic zone is
34. ICNT, supra note 5, art. 3.
35. Compare id. arts. 17-32 with Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 21, arts.
14-23.
36. See ICNT, supra note 5, arts. 2, 18-20.
37. Compare id. arts. 17-26 with arts. 34-44.
38. Id. arts. 39, 41, 42.
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substantial from both a geographic and substantive viewpoint. Over
one-third of the oceans are within 200 nautical miles of the coast.
39
With the exception of migratory species and certain other stocks, vir-
tually all of the world's salt water fisheries are found within 200
nautical miles of the coast. 40  A 200-nautical-mile line embraces a
very substantial portion of most of the continental margins and re-
lated basins of the world's oceans, and therefore a very substantial
proportion of that part of the seabed that has hydrocarbon poten-
tial.4 1  It is not possible to navigate between a majority of coastal
States in the world without passing within 200 nautical miles of the
coast of a third State.
4 2
The most hotly contested issue with respect to allocation of juris-
diction related to fisheries. Many coastal States proposed a com-
plete reversal of the classic high seas allocation of jurisdiction to the
flag State, namely an allocation of complete discretionary fisheries
management jurisdiction to the coastal State throughout a 200-mile
zone. These States did of course acknowledge that there would have
to be a duty to cooperate and coordinate with respect to stocks of fish
that fall within the jurisdictional limits of two or more States and,
somewhat more reluctantly, with respect to stocks of fish that migrate
seaward of the 200-mile zone. Despite general coastal State hostility
to institutional arrangements regarding fisheries, agreement was pos-
sible on references to institutional arrangements where such ar-
rangements would be necessary to manage a "common pool" re-
source, namely with particular respect to highly migratory species 43
and marine mammals, 4
4 and in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas,
45
where the cooperation of many States might be necessary to imple-
ment a sound program of conservation and management.
Management of the "common pool" fishery resource is generally
the only exception to the opposition to institutional arrangements for
fisheries. 46 Under the ICNT, the coastal States accept legal duties to
39. See generally J. PRESCO'r, THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE OCEANS
(1975).
40, Id. See also A. KOLODKIN, THE WORLD OCEAN (1974).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. ICNT, supra note 5, art. 64; see Utz, Comment: U.S. Distant Water Fishing
Industry, 10 LAw. Am. 921 (1978).
44. ICNT, supra note 5, art. 65.
45. Id. arts. 122-23.
46. Id. arts. 61-62. With respect to anadromous species such as salmon "common
pool" problems beyond 200 miles were largely reduced by allocation of jurisdiction to
the State in whose rivers anadromous stocks originate; thus the reference to regional
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conserve fish stocks and to ensure their optimum utilization; that is,
to allow foreign access under reasonable terms and conditions to that
portion of the allowable catch that the coastal State cannot, for the
time being, harvest by itself.4 7 Agreement also appears near on the
question of access of landlocked and "geographically disadvantaged"
States to the fisheries of the economic zones of their coastal State
neighbors. 48 There are no mandatory institutional limitations in the
text, however, that in general would serve to implement or comple-
ment these legal limitations.
The ICNT is unprecedented, among basic international political
and economic instruments, in its elaborate and detailed attention to
environmental questions. The text establishes sweeping legal limita-
tions on all States with respect to activities at sea subject to their
jurisdiction, propounding a duty to protect and preserve the marine
environment.
The principle of Article 10 of the Convention on the High Seas
dominates the approach of the ICNT to the question of institutional
limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction for environmental purposes,
but with an interesting new element. Not only are national environ-
mental regulations with respect to activities at sea required to be "no
less effective" than applicable international regulations, but States are
required to cooperate with each other in the elaboration of interna-
tional regulations by the "competent international organization"
where such 'regulations do not exist or where they need to be sup-
plemented.
5 0
While some of the references to the competent international or-
ganization, particularly with respect to ships, are regarded by many
participants as references to IMCO, there are other institutions, such
as the United Nations Environment Program for example, that may
be regarded as the appropriate place to elaborate international stan-
dards, rules and practices with respect to particular types of activities.
A fascinating aspect of these references is that the duty to comply
organizations is qualified by the words "where appropriate." Id. art. 66. Similar pro-
visions for catadromous species contain no reference to an organization. Id. art. 67.
47. Id. art. 62.
48. Id. arts. 69-71; see Report of Negotiating Group 4 in X Off. Rec., Third U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea (1978) [hereinafter cited as Off. Rec.].
49. Id. pt. XII.
50. Id. art. 198 generally urges global cooperation. Id. arts. 208-09 and 213 re-
fer to such "competent international organizations, or diplomatic conference,'" while arti-
cle 212 (vessel-source pollution) uses the word "organization" in the singular. Cf.
Convention on the High Seas, supra note 2, arts. 25-26.
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with international standards is elaborated without express reference to
a known organization with known procedural safeguards and exper-
tise. Even IMCO's Marine Environment Protection Committee is a
one state one vote" body.
One response to this point would doubtlessly be that under the
rule of Article 10 of the Convention on the High Seas, States that are
not otherwise legally bound by a standard by virtue of their other
treaty commitments would become bound under the rule of Article
10 only if the standard becomes "generally accepted." ICNT Article
94, the equivalent provision, uses the "generally accepted" criterion as
well. In the early stages of the Conference, however, a handful of
delegates refused to permit similar language to be used consistently in the
drafting of the chapter on protection and preservation of the marine
environment. 5 l The problem now is that it is difficult to alter texts at a
later stage of negotiation. Many delegations fear that there could be a
general unraveling of delicate political compromises in any substantive
review.
Some may argue that no clarification is necessary since there is
no rational way of interpreting the marine environment chapter ex-
cept in conformity with the principle of Article 10 of the Convention
on the High Seas. It cannot be maintained that the duty under the
ICNT to respect international regulations refers only to those regula-
tions to which the particular State in question is bound by some other
treaty, as this would render virtually all of the environmental provi-
sions meaningless. Similarly, it cannot be maintained that a regulation
adopted by the competent international organization, whether or not
generally accepted, is binding upon all States parties to the Law of
the Sea Convention, particularly when the procedures for adopting
regulations and safeguarding relevant interests are not even men-
tioned.
It is difficult to argue with this legal reasoning, as most would
surely agree that it is sound. Nevertheless, there is an opportunity to
deal with the drafting problem in a way that would minimize, and in
all probability eliminate, any substantial risk of reopuning delicate
compromises. The Drafting Committee of the Conference will be
faced with the question of harmonizing terminology and texts. It will
51. Compare ICNT arts. 212(2), 212(4), & 212(5) (last sentence), which specify
the "generally accepted" criterion in elaborating rights and obligations with respect to
international rules and standards, with ICNT arts. 209(3), 211, 212(5) (third sen-
tence), 215, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 227, & 229, which do not expressly refer to
that criterion.
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therefore have to examine various different phrases, including the dif-
ferences in wording found in Article 94 and the provisions on protec-
tion and preservation of the marine environment. Thus the Drafting
Committee would have a basis for examining this question without
running the risk of reopening substantive negotiations, since substan-
tive negotiation is beyond the mandate of the Committee.
52
The ICNT provisions on protection and preservation of the
marine environment illustrate the use of legal and institutional limita-
tions as a means of resolving problems regarding allocation of jurisdic-
tion. It was argued that flag States must ensure that their ships re-
spect relevant international limitations. Some coastal States argued
that this alone was inadequate to protect coastal interests because
many flag States lack sufficient interest or capacity to ensure en-
forcement of those limitations. A few States argued that international
limitations even if enforced were inadequate, and that accordingly
there was a role for coastal State prescriptive competence with re-
spect to pollution from ships in a 200-mile zone.
The solution reached, although phrased in terms of prescriptive
jurisdiction, is that the coastal State is given jurisdiction over pollu-
tion from ships in the 200-mile economic zone solely for the purpose
of enforcing international standards or, in special cases, particular dis-
charge standards proposed by the coastal State and approved by the
competent international organization. 53  In addition a State is given
power to enforce international standards with respect to foreign ships
that voluntarily enter its ports.A" The scope of coastal State enforce-
ment jurisdiction is fairly broad in ports and in the territorial sea. 55 It
is more limited in the economic zone,5 6 where interference with
freedom of navigation was regarded as more dangerous for juridical as
well as practical reasons. In brief, the jurisdictional allocation of the
provisions on protection and preservation of the marine environment
can only be understood, at least with respect to vessel-source pollu-
tion, in the context of the limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction
within the chapter.
The greatly expanded reliance in the ICNT on legal and institu-
tional limitations as part of a consensus on allocation of jurisdiction
gives considerably greater weight to the persistent questions of im-
52. Rules of Procedure, A/CONF. 62/30/Rev. 2, rule 53.
53. Id. art. 212. But see id. art. 235 (ice-covered areas).
54. Id. art. 219.
55. Id. art. 221.
56. Id. Compare paras. 1 & 2 with paras. 3-8.
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plementation of and respect for legal and institutional limitations on
the exercise of jurisdiction.
With respect to legal limitations, the Conference has made un-
precedented strides with respect to the inclusion, as an integral part
of the Convention, of mandatory third-party settlement of disputes
leading, in many significant cases, to a binding decision. 57 This adds
an institutional dimension to the legal limitations. That fact is made
clear by a comparison of the subjects that are included or excluded
from compulsory third-party procedures with those that are subject to
institutional limitations in the relevant substantive articles.
While the correlation is only a rough one, it will be noted for
example that there is virtually no role for binding third-party dispute
settlement with respect to fisheries in the economic zone, although
the proposed compromise would include some compulsory third-party
conciliation in certain fisheries cases. 58 This is consistent with the
general coastal State resistance to institutional limitations on coastal
State jurisdiction with respect to fisheries in the economic zone.
Conversely, with respect to navigation and protection and preserva-
tion of the marine environment, the system for compulsory and bind-
ing third-party settlement of disputes is generally applicable. 5 9 This
is consistent with the reliance on institutional limitations in the sub-
stantive provisions regarding high seas freedoms and the protection and
preservation of a marine environment.
With respect to institutional limitations, there are references to
international organizations, whether global or regional, in seventy-two
articles of the ICNT (not including references to the proposed Seabed
Authority or dispute settlement organs under Parts XI and XV of the
ICNT). Almost none of the references name the organizations.6" This
total does not include articles whose implementation is dependent
upon the existence and smooth functioning of an international or re-
gional organization, or references to the United Nations itself.
It is important to bear in mind that the need for new institu-
tional limitations is created by the changes in allocation of jurisdiction
at sea and in the effects of such allocation, not by a Convention on
57. See generally ICNT, supra note 5, pt. XV.
58. Id. art. 296; Report of Negotiating Group 5 in X Off. Rec., supra note 48.
59. ICNT, supra note 5, art. 296, para. 2.
60. ICNT, supra note 5, arts. 22, 39, 41, 53, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 72, 93, 118,
119, 123, 139, 143, 160, 162, 168, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 208,
209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 217, 218, 219, 221, 223, 224, 239, 240, 243, 244, 245,
247, 248, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 263, 264, 266, 267, 269, 270,
272, 273, 274, 276, 278, 296; Annex VII, arts. 2, 3.
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the Law of the Sea as such. Similar need would exist if these changes
occured through the evolution of customary international law, al-
though the slower pace of change might encourage the development
of less formal mechanisms for restraint in some cases.
At least three major tasks must be undertaken in response to this
need:
(1) a survey of the legal and technical competence of existing
international and regional organizations in light of the new jurisdic-
tional allocations and limitations;
(2) allocation of functions among international and regional or-
ganizations, considering any necessary changes in the functions or
structure of existing organizations and the need for new organiza-
tions; and
(3) coordination among international and regional organizations
in order to insure a reasonable harmony in the implementation of
the rules of the law of the sea. 
61
Several States from various regions have now introduced a proposal
for a Conference declaration or resolution that would deal with the
general institutional questions posed by the ICNT. 62  Among the
measures contained therein would be a request that the Secretary
General of the United Nations appoint an ad hoe study group of emi-
nent persons to review and identify gaps in the present institutional
arrangements in the field of international ocean affairs, evaluate the
institutional implications resulting from the implementation of the
Law of the Sea Convention, and formulate alternative proposals
aimed at improving the effectiveness of the system.
One of the most fundamental contributions of the principle in
Article 10 of the Convention on the High Seas is the merger it effects
between legal and institutional limitations on the sphere of discretion
of a State to which jurisdiction is allocated. The traditions of custom-
ary international law are ever present in the requirement that a stan-
dard must be "generally accepted" before it becomes binding on all
States as a matter of international law. A quasilegislative role for in-
61. An explicit reference to the imposition of institutional limitations on the exer-
cise of jurisdiction by a named international organization occurs in Article 39 in con-
nection with the duty of civil aircraft to respect rules elaborated by the International
Civil Aviation Organization during overflight of straits. This specific reference is
perhaps appropriate because the functions of ICAO extend beyond the oceans them-
selves. Also it reflects the fact that the Convention on International Civil Aviation,
supra note 12, is one of the most widely ratified treaties in the world. See also ICNT
art. 297.
62. A/CONF.62/L.30, 18 May 1978.
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ternational institutions is implicit in the drafting of Article 10 of the
Convention on the High Seas and explicit in the equivalent Article 94
in the ICNT. Aside from Part XI with respect to the deep seabeds,
63
the approach of the ICNT is consistent with the underlying principle:
that a Convention on the Law of the Sea is intended to elaborate
fundamental international law on the subject, and therefore no at-
tempt is made to confer specific legislative power on a specific inter-
national organization. Even the provisions on compulsory third-
party settlement of disputes provide a wide range of institutional
choices. The residual method of binding dispute settlement is
arbitration-the least institutional of the alternatives. 
64
By way of contrast, Part XI of the ICNT would establish a
specific international organization with the power to make specific
binding decisions with respect to seabed mining. For this reason Part
XI deals with a whole range of institutional questions addressed in
separate treaties with respect to the many other international organi-
zations whose functioning is essential to the overall vitality of the
Convention and its underlying accommodations. 65 The functions and
powers of the proposed Seabed Authority as well as its decision-
making processes are dealt with in the kind of detail that might be
expected in an international treaty establishing an international or-
ganization. Indeed the provisions of Part XI are considerably more
detailed than those of many such treaties. This probably reflects a
desire of States to include legal protections in the treaty on certain
points rather than rely on their capacity to influence decisions of the
international organization: prolific detail is the result.6 6
No amount of detail however can overcome the underlying legal
problem posed by the desire to ensure that regulations of the Seabed
Authority that are adopted by less than express unanimous consent
are legally binding on all. There is no way to avoid the underlying
63. See generally ICNT, supra note 5. See also Orrego-Vicuia, The Regime for
the Exploitation of the Seabed Mineral Resources: A Latin American View, 10 LAw.
AM. 774 (1978).
64. ICNT, supra note 5, art. 287, paras. 3 & 5, establish arbitration as the re-
sidual means for dispute settlement. Annex VI details specific procedures for arbitra-
tion.
65. Compare the reliance on "generally accepted" international environmental
rules and standards elaborated by other international organizations in ICNT, pt.
XII, supra note 51, with the detailed environmental provisions in ICNT arts. 139,
145, 16 0 (2)(xiv), 163(2) (xi)-(xiii), 210, 216, and Annex I, para. 11(a)(2)(xiii) and
Il(b)(6).
66. ICNT, supra note 5, pt. XI contains 60 articles; Annexes II & Ill contain 28
paragraphs, some of which occupy several pages of print.
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need for "general" acceptance. If the purpose of international institu-
tions is to place limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction, then it
must be recalled that the purpose of a Seabed Authority is to place
limitations on the sphere of discretion of the flag State.6 7 Unless the
States capable of exercising that discretion are prepared to consent to
the regulatory system, it cannot perform its restraining functions.
These States cannot be expected to yield their ability to control the
imposition of restraints under a contractual (universal express consent)
approach to limitations, or even under a more liberal approach that
binds all to "generally accepted" standards, without strong procedural
protections for their interests in any decisionmaking process. Look-
ing upon the creation of the Seabed Authority as an allocation of
jurisdiction rather than a limitation on its exercise solves nothing: the
same questions are posed regarding the acceptability of the allocation,
but in a sharper ideological context.
Needless to say, the role of the Conference on the Law of the
Sea itself as an institutional limitation on the process of allocation of
jurisdiction has not escaped the participants. The question arises as to
whether the overall implementation and growth of the Convention in
the future should be subject to some institutional arrangements. This
question is related to, but distinct from, the question of amendment
and revision.
Third-party dispute settlement procedures would go far in pro-
moting both uniformity and necessary flexibility. On a political level,
Peru proposes the creation of an International Commission (or com-
mittee) on the Law of the Sea, composed of all States Parties to the
Convention, that would meet periodically to review questions related
to the interpretation and application of the Convention. 68  Portugal
proposes that the Secretary General of the United Nations convene
periodic conferences of the parties to the Convention to review its
interpretation and applicaton. 69
The Portugese proposal, addressing the question of events out-
side the framework of the Convention itself, alludes to tle need to
take into account "institutional and legal developments." The implica-
tion is much clearer in the Peruvian proposal that the international
67. Id. For a discussion of the role of" the Authority in seabed mining by States
and their nationals, see Ratiner & Wright, The Billion Dollar Decision: Is Deepsea
Mining a Prudent Investment?, 10 LAw. AM. 713 (1978).
68. A/CONF. 62/L.22, 10 April 1978.
69. A/CONF.62/L.23, 4 May 1978. These proposals are distinct from the question
of a review clause in connection with the seabed mining regime in Part XI.
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commission "examine all questions relating to the harmonization of
the provisions of this Convention with . . . rules of customary inter-
national law governing various aspects of the Law of the Sea."
70
Peru's historic advocacy of unilateralism as the basis for allocation of
geographic jurisdiction at sea may invite cautious inquiry regarding
the impact of such language on the legal effect of the entire treaty.
Whatever the merits of these particular proposals, the implicit
invitation to consider the problem of adaptation of the law is timely.
At the least, it should emphasize the need for respected international
interpretive institutions if the Convention is to be flexible enough to
withstand the inevitable storms of controversy regarding the meaning
and application of particular provisions.
The principles of the law of the sea, customary or conventional,
are the reference points in the elaboration of an effective system of
cooperation and governance in the oceans. The quality of various in-
ternational institutions will increasingly affect not only the operation
of that system, but the maturation of the legal principles themselves.
The key to the process is the principle in Article 10 of the Conven-
tion on the High Seas. The concept of the legally binding character of
the generally accepted international standard can serve mankind well
in the broad twilight between contract and constitutional government.
To protect its utility, the point must be repeated as often as necessary
that the concept is not the equivalent of either. It is a servant of a
world that needs stronger institutions than contract, but that is far
from conferring legislative powers and legitimacy on most interna-
tional institutions.
70. Supra note 68.
